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NOTES AND COMMENT
that adduced on the first trial. 10 However, precedent lays down the
practical rule that where two different juries have found a verdict
for the same party on the same evidence the second finding should
not be disregarded and lightly cast aside merely because the trial court
may not agree with it. In the absence of unusual or extraordinary
circumstances, the verdict should be sustained so that there may be an
end to the litigation.
WILLIAm F. McGINN.
ESTATE TAXES-INTER Vivos TRANSFER WITH POSSIBILITY OF
REVERSION
Where the decedent during his lifetime made a transfer of an
interest in real or personal property either by deed, trust, insurance
contract' or any other instrument by the terms of which he reserved
the power to revoke any part thereof, the estate tax laws, both federal
and New York State, hold such property to be taxable as a part of the
decedent's gross estate.2
Where the transfer is irrevocable, but the possibility of reversion
nevertheless exists dependent upon some condition set forth in the
instrument, the question of taxability is not as settled. In recent
years the subject of inter zvvos transfers has been litigated more than
any other estate tax question.
When the leading Supreme Court case of Klein v. United States 3
was decided in 1930 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue attempted
to extract from the decision the rule that all transfers subject to the
possibility of reversion are taxable. The court in that case held that
a deed containing a provision that title was to revert to the grantor in
the event the grantee were to predecease him was a transfer merely of
a life estate; the transfer of the remainder could not be complete until
the death of the grantor. While the lower courts in cases following
the Klein case often adhered to the rule of that case,4 many decisions
10 McCann v. N. Y. & Q. County R. R. Co., 73 App. Div. 305, 306-8, 76
N. Y. Supp. 684 (1902), appeal dismissed, 172 N. Y. 599, 64 N. E. 1123 (1902) ;
Gutman v. Weisbarth, 194 App. Div. 351, 354-5, 185 N. Y. Supp. 261 (1920);
Lyman v. Village of Potsdam, 204 App. Div. 528, 529, 198 N. Y. Supp. 526(1923); Gnecco v. Pederson, 154 N. Y. Supp. 12, 14-15 (1915).
1 Goldstone v. United States, 325 U. S. 687, 65 Sup. Ct. 398 (1945).2 INT. Ry. Cona § 811(c), (d); N. Y. TAx LAW §249-r(4).
3 Klein v. United States, 282 U. S. 828, 51 Sup. Ct. 78 (1930); Klein v.
United States, 283 U. S. 231, 51 Sup. Ct. 398 (1930).
4 Union Trust Co. of Detroit v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 152, 52 Sup. Ct.
500 (1931); Estate of Morris Schinasi, 25 B. T. A. 1153 (1932); Estate of
Alfred J. Reach, 27 B. T. A. 972 (1933); Estate of. Waldo C. Bryant, 36
B. T. A. 669 (1937); Estate of John S. Conant, 41 B. T. A. 739 (1940);
Central Nat. Bank of Cleveland v. United States, 41 F. Supp. 239 (D. C. Md.
1941).
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purported to hold that no such rule was intended in instances where
the possibility of reverter was extremely remote.5
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Klein v. United States in the
leading case of Helvering v. Hallock.6 The transfer in this case was
by means of a trust instrument where a life estate was vested in the
beneficiary but the remainder was subjected to the possibility of re-
verting to the donor. The court here held the transfer, less the value
of the life estate, subject to tax. But here again the lower courts, in
subsequent decisions, in overruling the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, refused to tax transfers where the facts showed the possi-
bility of reverter to be extremely remote.7
Thus, in the Biddle case,8 the Federal Tax Court found the facts
showed "the possibility of any reversion to the transferor so remote
as to be practically nil." 1 In the Allen case 10 the facts showed that
the decedent was survived by at least ten persons all younger than
himself who would have had to have predeceased him in order for the
corpus of the irrevocable trust involved to have reverted to him. Tech-
nically the possibility of reversion existed in both these cases. Ac-
tually such a possibility was an absurdity. Judgment in the Biddle
and the Allen cases were thus rendered for the taxpayer and against
the Commissioner.
No case where the possibility of reversion was so remote as to be
practically nil has, at this writing, been decided by the Supreme Court.
The Klein and Hallock decisions, not having touched upon the sub-
ject of extent of possibility, it has been argued by the government that
extent is immaterial."l Yet in the light of the many lower court de-
cisions taking cognizance of remoteness, the Commissioner .of Internal
Revenue, after declaring a transfer taxable and being reversed in the
Tax'Court, has in recent years followed a policy of pressing the mat-
ter no further. In many instances, after appealing from an adverse
decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the Commissioner consented
to the dismissal of the appeal.12
5 Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 Sup. Ct. 78 (1935);
Estate of Anna S. Taft, 33 B. T. A. 671 (1935) ; Estate of Frederick W. Van
Sicklen, 35 B. T. A. 306 (1937) ; Estate of Anna Davis Terry, 38 B. T. A. 593
(1938) ; Estate of Harriet M. Casey, 39 B. T. A. 13 (1939).0 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444 (1940).
? Lloyd's Estate v. Commissioner, 141 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944);
Estate of Joseph K. Cass, 3 T. C. 71 (1944); Estate of Harris Fahnestock,
4 T. C. 1096 (1945); Fifth Ave. Bank of N. Y. v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp. 753
(E. D. N. Y. 1945) ; Estate of Mary B. Hunnewell, 4 T. C. 1128 (1945);
Estate of Nina Camparani, 5 T. C. 488 (1945).
8 Estate of Frances Biddle, 3 T. C. 832 (1944).
9 Id. at 836.
10 Estate of Benjamin L. Allen, 3 T. C. 844 (1944).
"1 Commissioner v. Kellogg, 119 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Lloyd's
Estate v. Commissioner, 141 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).
12 Estate of Frances Biddle, 3 T. C. -832 (1944); Estate of H. T. Sloane,
Memo, T. C., 6/8/44.
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The New.York State Tax Law, in.its efforts to achieve as much
uniformity as possible with the federal laws in matters of estate taxes,
has followed the federal courts on this question. 18 Prior to Septem-
ber 1, 1930, however, this type of transfer was not subject to tax
under New York law.14
How remote must the possibility of reversion be in order to con-
stitute the transfer an absolute and complete gift during the lifetime
of the transferor and hence not subject to the Estate Tax? Attempts
have been made to draw a fine line between what constitutes a possi-
bility so remote as to be equivalent to no possibility at all, and what
constitutes a reasonable possibility.1 5 Even if a hard and fast line
were set by statute or by the courts, it would still be exceedingly
difficult to place many such trusts or other transfers on one side of
the line or the other. The facts will differ in each case as they have
in the past. The laws applicable to trusts will still, as they do now,
vary from state to state. The Federal Government, in interpret-
ing any trust agreement is bound, in most instances, to take into
account the laws of the state in which the agreement was drawn.1 6
More than three quarters of an estate may be eaten up by estate
taxes alone where the estate is big enough 17 and it is in the larger
estates that inter vivos transfers are most common. The stakes being
high, litigation ensues only too frequently.
The question as yet unresolved is certain to appear in the courts
again and again.
NEWCOMB. B. PINEs.
ADEmPriON BY A COMMITTEE OF AN INSANE TESTATOR
The conflict in the United States concerning the orrect rule in
ademption by a committee of an insane testator was manifested by the
Illinois case of Lewis v. Hill, decided in 1944.1 This case affirmed
what is considered to be the majority ruling in such actions.2
13 Matter of Cregan, 275 N. Y. 337, 9 N. E. (2d) 953 (1937).
'14 Estate of Isabelle C. Kirby v. State Tax Commission, 228 App. Div. 171,
239 N. Y. Supp. 390 (1930) ; Matter of Schweinert, 133 Misc. 762, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 307 (1929).
15 Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48, 56 Sup. Ct. 78 (1935);
Commissioner v. Kellogg, 119 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
16 Sharpe's Estate v. Commissioner, 148 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945);
Vaccaro v. United States 149 F. (2d) 1014 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945) ; Commissioner
v. Porter, 148 F. (2d) ?66 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
17 Federal Estate Tax rates range as high as 20% basic tax and 77% addi-
tional tax. The New York Estate Tax ranges as high as 20%. (See INT.
Ray. CODE §§ 810 and 935; N. Y. TAx LAW § 249n.)
ILewis v. Hill, 387 II. 542, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 (1944).
2 Wilmerton v. Wilmerton, 176 Fed. 896, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 401 (1910);
1946
